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1.  Introduction 
The South African automotive industry has become much more integrated 
into the global industry since 1995 and has been characterized by rapid export 
expansion and growing foreign ownership. But industry wide changes take 
place at the level of the firm and the objective of this paper is to investigate 
the interplay between trade liberalization and the processes of learning, 
technical change and capability development at the firm level.
While the nature of industrial development under protection may constrain 
domestic firms’ capacity to restructure production in a more liberalized 
environment, the accumulation of technological capabilities can also make 
it possible for firms to adapt quite rapidly and take advantage of new 
international linkages in the form of export markets and supply opportunities 
to multinational firms establishing domestic operations. In the liberalization 
phase, increased foreign control and ownership has frequently been central 
to the adjustment process. But this in turn has significant implications, both 174      Anthony Black  
positive and negative, for the nature of technological development and for 
upgrading more generally. 
Section two examines the character and trajectory of technical change 
in manufacturing firms in developing countries and, more specifically, in the 
South African automotive component sector. Apart from different factor costs 
and much lower technological capacity, developing countries have historically 
been characterized by differences in industrial structure, smaller markets and 
relatively higher levels of protection. This had important implications for their 
capacity to adjust to global competition. Liberalization has a shattering effect 
on the previously protected industrial structure and this transition from low 
volume, flexible producer for domestic markets to high volume supplier to 
international markets is a wrenching one. The impact is so much the greater 
because of the significantly increased role of foreign firms. 
The main section (section three) presents a series of case studies of how 
component firms developed under protection and how they have responded 
to changes in the trade regime.1 Case studies naturally suffer from the 
usual limitations of this approach in that they do not allow for generalized 
conclusions.2 Nevertheless they are instructive on the complex links between 
the technological capability of firms, changes in the trade regime and firm 
level restructuring. The case studies have been conducted at various points 
in the liberalization process starting in 1992 (Table 1). The same firms and 
others were then visited at various points up until 2010. It has, therefore, been 
possible to track their progress over an extended period of rapid change in 
the automotive industry, giving a ‘before and after’ picture of the interplay 
between protection, technological learning and liberalization. 
Section four draws conclusions from the case studies. Firms had adapted 
quite efficiently to the previously protected environment in a number of ways. 
When the liberalization process began, they embarked on major changes. For 
local firms these changes proved difficult in many cases as investments and 
production capabilities were singularly inappropriate for the new era of global 
Table 1: Dates of Case Study Interviews
Firm  Date of interviews
Alfred Teves (Ate)  1995, 2006
Atlantis Diesel Engines (now  1992, 1995, 2007, 2010
Atlantis Foundries
Behr  2002, 2007
Toyota  1995, 2007, 2010
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competition. In spite of this, significant learning had taken place and firms had 
developed considerable technological capability. This has made it possible for 
them to adapt to a changing environment, by absorbing foreign technology 
and responding to new export opportunities. However, the limitations of 
what can be termed ‘internal restructuring’ are also very evident. For many 
firms, as the industry was opened up to international competition, it became 
increasingly difficult for them to continue to operate as locally owned entities, 
reliant on licensed technology. To continue as first tier suppliers, foreign 
links, including foreign ownership in some cases, became essential in order 
to source technology and gain access to global networks. Growing foreign 
ownership in turn has a range of implications for domestic firms and for the 
industry as a whole.
 
2.  Learning, Technical Change and the Trade Regime 
In the late 1980s, the literature on technical change in less developed 
countries started to shift from a view of technological dependency to one 
which pointed to the substantial amount of technological activity that goes 
on in developing countries. This was evident in productivity improvements in 
protected industries as well as growing exports of sophisticated manufactured 
products, technology and capital equipment.3 These findings are no longer 
contentious and the key areas of debate are now the main forms of acquisition 
of technological capability and how these are affected by factors such as the 
industrial structure, ownership and the trade regime as well as by more direct 
policy interventions. 
Historically, the trajectory of technical change in developing countries 
has differed in important ways from that in the developed world (Katz, 1984, 
2000). Limited markets and protection meant that plants were frequently small 
in relation to those in developed countries and economies of scale issues were 
a key consideration in technical choice. This implied the need to scale down 
to smaller plant size and diversify product mix requiring in turn simpler, more 
universal, lower capacity machinery. This frequently led to discontinuous 
technology and low levels of automation. In products such as vehicles and 
components where continuous flow is necessary, firms in developing countries 
could “end up with the worst of all worlds – that is, with a small continuous 
flow ‘line’ turning out a highly diversified output mix, intended for various, 
small individual markets” (Katz, 1984: 11). 
Katz (1984) also pointed to the weakly developed layers of subcontracting 
firms, which resulted in higher levels of vertical integration within the 
firm than would be the case in developed countries. This reduced the level 
of technological specialization and was also likely to result in the under-
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With these kinds of developments, it was not surprising that the view that 
industrialization behind tariff barriers was likely to produce un-innovative 
and inward-looking enterprises became something of a conventional wisdom 
on the subject, with the automotive industry a frequently cited example. 
However, work especially in Latin America by Katz and others showed that 
it would be an oversimplification to cast most firms in protected industries 
within this category. Many of the firms within protected industries may have 
been technologically quite dynamic within the parameters in which they 
operated, with rapid learning taking place and a considerable accumulation of 
technological capability. However, as a result of the trade regime, industrial 
structure and factor prices under import substituting industrialization (ISI), 
much of this effort is mis-directed according to benchmarks of international 
competitiveness. An example is the vast amount of effort in areas such as 
logistics, materials flow, machine changeovers and production scheduling 
that is undertaken in order to deal with the problems of complexity that 
arise in low volume, multi-product plants, which have characterized the 
automotive and component industry in developing countries. Firms thus 
became well-adapted or even ‘over-adapted’ to the circumstances of captive, 
protected markets – what Pirela et al. (1993) refer to as the ‘platypus effect’. 
The problem, therefore, was not so much a lack of technological effort, but 
the fact that cost minimization and achieving optimal potential from world 
scale plant was not the central objective of technological effort. These 
preliminary observations will be shown to have a clear resonance in the 
pre-liberalization phase of the South African automotive sector illustrated 
in section three. 
The South African automotive industry, which was highly protected until 
the early 1990s, has historically depended heavily on imported technology. 
Although there has been until the late 1990s, a high degree of local ownership, 
the locally owned vehicle manufacturers and the bulk of locally owned, first 
tier component producers operated under license from European, Japanese 
or American firms. This involved royalty costs and also imposed restrictions 
on exporting, which was a serious constraint for some firms as the domestic 
market came under pressure and firms were forced to develop export 
strategies. In spite of these disadvantages, many firms considered licensing to 
be the most cost effective way to obtain up to date technology.
However, while firms spent relatively little on R&D and were generally 
highly dependent on foreign licenses, they were by no means totally lacking 
in technological capacity (Black, 1994). On the product side they possessed 
the capacity for design even if only in a limited form. On the process side, 
firms were not only able to fully master the technologies they were working 
with but also to upgrade them by introducing adaptations. Some important 
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production, which characterized the South African components industry 
(Black, 1994). This technological capability is, however, of limited value in 
the international market place except in the production of certain low volume 
aftermarket and replacement parts. 
2.1  Liberalization, Technological Capability and FDI 
Liberalization has a number of important effects at the firm level. In his 
survey of the experience of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Katz (2000) argues 
that MNCs and large domestic conglomerates were the main beneficiaries. 
With growing foreign ownership, firms tended to become more specialized 
and scaled down their local engineering activities, engaging more in final 
assembly and distribution. Small and medium enterprises also tended to 
become more involved in final assembly operations with a greater reliance 
on imported inputs. These conclusions are supported by Rheinhardt and Peres 
(2000: 1557), also in relation to Latin America, who argue that enterprises 
linked to international markets were the major gainers and also that “domestic 
linkages and the development of endogenous technological capabilities have 
been weakened” in the liberalization process. 
Greater openness usually leads to an expansion of international linkages 
including greater FDI. Whether they establish greenfield sites or take over 
existing enterprises, foreign firms bring with them new technology and 
may also establish new supplier networks involving both domestic and 
foreign firms. Two issues are of direct concern here. The first is the role that 
foreign links, especially equity links, may play in enabling existing firms to 
successfully integrate themselves into global networks. The second is the 
related question of the impact of increasing internationalization and foreign 
ownership on the capabilities of the domestic industry. 
The restructuring of production networks has important implications. 
In the automotive industry, trends towards ‘global sourcing’ and ‘follower 
sourcing’ have had a major effect in emerging markets where the trend 
is towards fewer first tier suppliers and the greater use of foreign owned 
suppliers. For domestic firms, much will depend on the terms under which 
they are able to position themselves in these developing networks. They may 
emerge as favoured first tier suppliers, or be relegated to a more subordinate 
position as second tier suppliers or even find themselves excluded completely 
and increasingly dependent on the aftermarket. In trying to optimize their 
position, domestic suppliers may seek out a foreign partner. Naturally, a key 
potential asset brought in by a prospective foreign shareholder or owner is 
the access to markets, which they can provide. This is complemented by their 
control over technology necessary to supply export markets and to meet the 
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The literature on the impact of FDI on upgrading of domestic firms 
is mixed. For instance, the inflow of foreign capital may create a more 
demanding and competitive environment requiring domestic firms to upgrade, 
but it may also limit the need for indigenous technological adaptation 
(Lorentzen and Barnes, 2004) which can lead to downgrading both in terms of 
technological activity and in terms of position in the value chain. But a higher 
level of absorptive capacity and more robust capabilities within domestic firms 
and the host economy generally, are likely to lead to more positive spillovers 
and more developed linkages with the domestic economy (Kokko et al., 1996; 
Narula and Dunning, 2000; Lall and Narula, 2004). 
Humphrey and Salerno (2000) refer to the increasing centralization 
of design by multinational auto and component firms and the fact that in 
countries such as Brazil, first tier suppliers are now virtually all foreign 
owned. Rasiah (2007, 2011) found that foreign automotive component firms in 
East and Southeast Asia were less R&D intensive than their local counterparts. 
However, Humphrey and Salerno (2000: 172) also point to the emergence of 
a ‘sun and planets’ model in which developing countries have regional design 
centres linked to the global design headquarters.
Foreign firms appear to exhibit higher levels of productivity and more 
rapid growth, but again the evidence is not overwhelming (Saggi, 2006; 
Haddad and Harrison, 1993). In part this depends on how domestic firms are 
integrated into the global networks of multinationals. Typically, firms which 
are fully integrated into such global networks operate at larger scale with more 
advanced technology and attain higher levels of productivity than those which 
supply protected domestic markets. 
A key form of linkage with the domestic economy is through purchases 
of inputs. There is a considerable international literature which cites the 
limited linkages of foreign firms in developing countries. Nevertheless, there 
is considerable evidence that where large scale assembly plants are established 
by foreign firms, considerable backward linkages do develop. And the level 
of linkages is not static. In the Mexican automotive industry substantial 
upgrading occurred, but much of this was with other foreign owned firms 
rather than with Mexican suppliers (Carrillo, 2004). For Poland, Domanski 
and Gwosdz (2009) report similar developments with significant upgrading 
by foreign affiliates of multinational component suppliers. In a study of 
Volvo truck and bus plants in developing countries, Ivarsson and Alvstam 
(2005) found that while ‘follow source’ suppliers had gained a large share of 
purchases by these assemblers, the technology transfers via domestic firms 
were very significant. The impact of liberalization and FDI is therefore very 
much contingent on circumstances. 
In the South African case, the first tentative steps to liberalize the sector 
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significant liberalization took place with the introduction of the Motor Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP) in 1995. The MIDP made provision for 
gradually declining tariffs and a system by which automotive exports earn 
import credits which allow them to offset import duties. It also provided for 
the abolition of local content requirements.4 
Firms were therefore encouraged to rapidly develop exports and this 
meant a substantial reorientation of existing production and the necessity to 
re-position themselves in the international value chain. For many this was 
difficult. A number of divisions within the largest domestically owned groups 
such as Murray and Roberts, Metair and Dorbyl found themselves vacating the 
first tier and becoming second tier suppliers (Lorentzen and Barnes, 2004). 
In the late 1980s, levels of foreign ownership were quite low both 
among vehicle manufacturers and component producers in South Africa, but 
this changed with the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 and the 
country’s reacceptance back into the international community. The change 
in trade policy and resulting internationalization of the industry, manifested 
in growing exports and imports, had major implications for ownership. 
It became increasingly important for local firms to have links to global 
networks as a way of facilitating access to international markets. In South 
Africa, and indeed in other emerging markets, foreign owned assemblers 
increasingly prefer to source components from joint ventures and wholly 
owned subsidiaries rather than domestically owned firms. The result for 
many South African firms has been that they either needed to seek out an 
international partner or faced the prospect of being confined to the aftermarket 
(Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000).5 
Growing foreign ownership has accelerated technological upgrading 
but this has taken a particular form (Barnes and Morris, 2004). The main 
conduits have been through transfers from foreign sources rather than an 
increase in domestic R&D. Domestic firms, under pressure to upgrade their 
technological and production capacities, have turned to foreign sources 
through the establishment of joint ventures, for example. There have been 
debates as to the impact of this. Earlier work by Barnes and Kaplinsky 
(2000) took a somewhat pessimistic view about the prospects for domestic 
suppliers, especially those without foreign connections. Lorentzen and Barnes 
(2004) and Lorentzen (2005) provide a generally more upbeat assessment 
of the prospects of domestically owned firms. In a series of case studies of 
South African component firms, Lorentzen (2005) argues that innovating 
firms tended to be either domestically owned or owned by ‘passive’ foreign 
investors. The latter, by supporting the R&D strategies of local managers, 
may improve absorptive capacities in domestic subsidiaries as opposed to 
typical TNCs, where decisions about upgrading or downgrading capabilities 
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worldwide group with possibly very negative implications. There is plenty of 
evidence that when local firms have come under the control of transnationals, 
existing R&D establishments are downsized or shut down.6 It does not follow, 
however, that these firms downgrade technologically because the shutting 
down of formal R&D facilities can be accompanied by the introduction of 
new specialized product and process technologies which bring host firms 
closer to the world frontier. With global sourcing, locally owned firms may 
also stop carrying out adaptations and reduce their R&D capacity. But as we 
argue in the case study of Alfred Teves below, this technological effort may 
in fact have been of little value in a more open trading environment. 
Perhaps a more useful distinction is the orientation of firms. There is a 
small group of component suppliers in South Africa which are either locally 
owned or have South African roots, but which have established themselves as 
world players. Examples have included Tiger Wheels, Bosal and Plate Glass. 
These firms are very different in their technological trajectory to first tier 
suppliers which depend on foreign licenses and may well do R&D, but within 
much more circumscribed parameters. This latter group are at a substantial 
disadvantage especially in export markets and as Lorentzen (2005) points out, 
there may be little incentive for either the licensor or licensee to expand the 
level of competence of the domestic operation. 
There is no doubt that foreign ownership, as opposed to licensing 
arrangements, has in many cases been critical for vehicle producers to obtain 
major export contracts, but the question is more complicated for component 
producers. Prior to the liberalization phase, it is clear that many locally owned 
firms were heavily constrained in export markets by conditions imposed by 
foreign licensors (Black, 1994). Since then, many firms have been able to 
renegotiate the terms of their license agreements. It is nevertheless surprising 
that data collected by the South African Automotive Benchmarking Club 
(SAABC, 2006), indicated that the level of export orientation for foreign 
and locally owned firms was the same, with both types of firms exporting 17 
per cent of their output. At least a part of the reason for the surprisingly low 
orientation towards exports by foreign owned firms is the fact that a number 
of foreign owned suppliers have established facilities in South Africa with the 
sole purpose of supplying component subsystems to domestic assemblers. 
On the other hand, a striking difference between foreign owned and 
domestically owned firms was the share of imports as a percentage of output. 
In the South African component sector, affiliates of multinationals imported 
53.7 per cent of their requirements compared to only 29.4 per cent by local 
firms (SAABC, 2006). The main explanation is that many new foreign 
component firms are ‘systems integrators’, supplying entire sub-assemblies to 
the vehicle manufacturer. This is more of an assembly than a manufacturing 
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economy although this may also reflect the fact that many of them are fairly 
new and so have not yet developed local sources of supply (Black, 2009).
 
3.  Case Studies of Firm Level Restructuring
As indicated above, the South African component sector was subject to a 
long period of protection but since 1989 became increasingly exposed to 
foreign competition. Coping with increasing competition was particularly 
challenging because firms had been operating in a fragmented domestic 
market with associated demand for a wide variety of components in low 
volumes. Exporting became a key imperative for many firms, partly to 
replace loss of domestic market share but also to achieve the benefits of 
specialization through higher volumes. In their endeavour to adjust to a new 
environment, firms pursued a range of strategies including the introduction 
of licensed technology, undertaking new investment, incremental adaptations 
of processes and products, shifting to new products and markets, upgrading 
the network of suppliers, reducing domestic sourcing and obtaining a foreign 
equity partner or owner. 
These strategies all have implications for the trajectory of technological 
capability of firms and are illustrated in the case studies which follow. The 
first case of Atlantis Diesel Engines (now Atlantis Foundries) is a firm which 
previously had received monopoly protection as a domestically owned, 
integrated engine producer. It has now become a foreign owned supplier of 
engine castings and machined components to international markets. The case 
study of Toyota South Africa (TSA) illustrates the radical transformation 
of its supplier network over the past decade which has resulted from the 
incorporation of TSA into the global network of the parent company, Toyota 
Motor Corporation. Alfred Teves illustrates how firms adapt to the problem of 
complexity and short production runs. The Behr case study indicates that while 
foreign ownership brings key advantages it also can have major implications 
for the type of R&D that occurs in the emerging market location. 
3.1  Atlantis Diesel Engines: Reorienting Production from Domestic to
   Global Markets 
In the mid 1990s, Atlantis Diesel Engines (ADE) was a large, state owned 
engine producer. The parastatal Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
owned 87.5 per cent and Daimler had a 12.5 per cent stake. Together with 
its affiliated companies, ADE manufactured diesel engines, castings and 
components. ADE was established as a ‘strategic’ industry in 1981 as South 
Africa’s political isolation deepened and economic sanctions became a 
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by a virtual prohibition on imports. The initial objectives were production 
capability of a wide range of products to high quality standards with 
production costs and profitability being lesser considerations. 
The plant was designed with an annual capacity of 45,000 engines (two 
shifts) divided into two engine makes (Perkins and Mercedes Benz) and the 
capability to produce a wide model range. World scale diesel engine plants 
produce in excess of 100,000 engines a year of a single make with a smaller 
model range. High production costs put exports out of reach and the slump 
in demand in the mid 1980s led to severe under-utilization of capacity. Thus 
ADE represented an extreme form of the inefficiencies of protection in an 
industry where economies of scale are important.
Strategic Direction 
By the late 1980s, ADE recognized that it had to restructure and when 
interviews were conducted in 1995, the company was half way through 
the transformation process from a monopoly engine supplier to component 
exporter. This process involved, firstly, a major internal focus on costs, which 
enabled ADE to sharply reduce engine prices in real terms from 1990 to 
1995. Secondly, the company sought to define areas of competitive advantage 
– which in its case were forming and adding value to metal rather than 
assembling engines. So the objective became one of gradually moving out 
of engine assembly to become a world class flexible manufacturer of major 
engine components. 
ADE therefore expected to move out of the truck engine assembly 
business in the future. As a result of falling tariffs, local truck manufacture 
was giving way to semi-knocked down assembly with much lower levels of 
local content. The commonization process which required South African truck 
makers to use ADE engines was being reversed. As its share of the domestic 
engine market was likely to drop rapidly as protection declined, the future 
viability of ADE depended on the extent to which it was able to remodel 
itself as a component exporter of major engine components. Export growth 
was rapid off a low base. 
Technology Licensing and the Acquisition of Production Capability
ADE manufactured engines and components under licence from Mercedes 
Benz and Perkins and from its inception relied on foreign technology and 
expertise. ADE regarded licensing to be a far more cost efficient method 
of getting access to technology in spite of the costs and the restrictions it 
imposed. The alternative of allowing licensing agreements to lapse and going 
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the freezing of the level of engine development. According to the financial 
director “if we (ADE) ever have visions of developing South African designed 
engines, we should kill them immediately … it is virtually impossible”.8 
Expatriates from Mercedes Benz AG were initially responsible for getting 
the factory running. They were gradually replaced by staff from ADE who 
received training in Germany. The length of time taken for expatriate staff 
to be replaced by local ADE management partly reflected the importance 
attached to particular functions by the licensor. Process technology capabilities 
were quickly acquired and transferred while the licensor kept greater control 
over product technology, skills which in any event would take much longer 
to transfer. In the case of the quality function, the licensor wished to maintain 
some control. 
The acquisition of investment and production capability can be divided 
into three phases. The first phase involved the licensor advising on the 
choice of equipment. Partly as a result of this and partly because of demand 
projections, which proved hopelessly optimistic, they adopted dedicated 
equipment. Some of the initial technology was fairly dated because the 
licensor thought this would be appropriate for African conditions. The second 
phase from the mid-eighties involved all planning being done by ADE with 
Mercedes Benz ‘looking over their shoulder’. For example in 1985/1986 ADE 
needed to introduce a new engine block because of local content requirements. 
They approached Mercedes Benz for advice. According to an ADE manager, 
“MBAG responded that you use a big transfer line which takes up a whole 
building and produces one block every 1.8 minutes and our requirement was 
one block every six hours.” Therefore, ADE did the planning themselves. This 
involved process innovation in the sense of adapting flexible technology (using 
a machining centre to perform all operations) to conventional technology. This 
was a lengthy process, but it eventually worked and the process technology 
went back to Mercedes in Germany who used it in the production of low 
volume engines. In the third phase, from 1990, ADE staff were able to 
carry out all investment decision making themselves and had developed 
full investment capability. When interviews were conducted in 1995, ADE’s 
capacity to select technology appropriate to its operating circumstances was 
highly developed. In line with its strategic direction, it was specializing in 
certain technologies involved in the manufacture of crankshafts, blocks and 
cylinder heads as well as forgings and castings. 
A similar set of processes took place in the foundry9 which was estab-
lished to supply castings for cylinder blocks and heads and was designed to 
supply 80-90 per cent of requirements for the planned engine capacity of 
50,000 Mercedes Benz and Perkins engines per year. As was the case with the 
main plant, the major problem has been the under-utilization of plant capacity 
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Initial design was a blend of technology in use for the range of castings 
to be produced. Total planned output of 12,000 tons/year was very small by 
international standards as most foundries had a capacity of over 50,000 tons 
per annum. ADE was also designed to produce an unusually large range of 
castings (approximately 20). By means of comparison the Mercedes Benz 
Mannheim plant produced only 14 types of casting and had a capacity of 
85,000 tons. The South African plant, therefore, had to be more flexible 
requiring compromises, for example, in machine selection. 
From the mid 1980s, improved rates of capacity utilization were achieved 
through exports and incremental investment, which enabled the foundry to 
achieve reasonable economies of scale. In 1990, a new pressure operated 
pouring furnace was installed which created the opportunity to synergize 
melting and moulding at the maximum output of the moulding capacity. 
This investment expanded capacity to 15,000 tons per annum and allowed 
ADE to service new export contracts to international customers such as 
Eaton, Ssangyong, MAN and Daewoo. By 1995, 40,000 engine blocks were 
being exported to Perkins of which 20,000 were machined. As a result of the 
expansion of export volumes, the plant was working at close to its 12,000 ton 
capacity by 1995, working three shifts in some areas. 
ADE did not do real research themselves, but sought to apply available 
technologies to specific operations. Formal and informal links with the 
licensor were important in order to receive exposure to international 
developments and new technologies. ADE was therefore a follower attempting 
to catch up rather than establish a lead. However, the company did have 
expertise in the selection and assessment of equipment and were constantly 
introducing improvements in process technology some of which incorporated 
their own innovations. The foundry undertook its own sub-assembly in the 
core shop and had found ways to integrate core assembly with minimum 
jointing. Another improvement was the shift away from hotbox methods to 
coldbox methods of core making. Automation levels were quite low but the 
signing of large export contracts such as the one with Ssangyong justified 
further automation such as the introduction of robotic fettling. 
The Takeover by DaimlerChrysler10
By 1995, ADE had shifted from being a monopoly engine producer for the 
domestic market to being reliant on component exports for most of its revenue. 
Because of heavy protection in the initial stages, the changes associated with 
a more open trading environment had been all the more wrenching involving 
a complete reorientation of the production process, which was initially 
established to supply a full range of engines at low volume. In 1998, ADE 
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of the fact that it had well developed markets for engine components the 
position of the firm was quite precarious.
In 2000, Atlantis Foundries and some of the machining lines were taken 
over by DaimlerChrysler and became fully incorporated into the parent 
company’s Mannheim based truck engine division. Its main business became 
the casting and machining of engine blocks. Large scale expansion of the 
foundry followed. At the time of the takeover it was exporting 20,000 tonnes 
per annum. By 2005/2006 this had increased to 45,000 tonnes, mainly of 
cylinder blocks, and capacity was being expanded to over 90,000 tonnes 
with the option of further expansion to 120,000 tonnes.11 The foundry was 
therefore now producing at world scale although its range is still extensive in 
terms of the number of types of castings produced. Fifty per cent of turnover 
was still accounted for by machined components but this was changing as the 
foundry expanded. 
Atlantis Foundries became fully integrated into the Mannheim truck 
division in a series of steps. The first phase was the installation of new 
machining capacity to handle high volume exports of machined engine blocks 
to Perkins. The next phase was to ‘marry up’ AF with DaimlerChrysler’s 
Mannheim foundry which produced blocks, cylinder heads and other products 
for Mercedes Benz and DaimlerChrysler subsidiaries. It also supplied into 
the North American market via DaimlerChrysler’s wholly owned subsidiary, 
Detroit Diesel, which in turn supplied engines to another subsidiary, 
Freightliner. Atlantis Foundries was also selected to supply engine blocks to 
a major new project codenamed ‘the heavy duty engine programme’ which 
supplies to Fuso in Japan, Mercedes Benz in Germany and Detroit Diesel in 
the US. 
Table 2 illustrates the close integration of Atlantis Foundries with the 
Mannheim Foundry, which was the development, marketing and distribution 
centre for the group and produced certain engine components. Atlantis 
Table 2:  Functional Integration of Atlantis Foundries with the 
  Mannheim Truck Division
  Atlantis Foundries  Mannheim Foundry
  Manufacturing centre  Design, manufacturing and
    marketing centre
10.8 litre blocks  –  100%
12.8 litre blocks  100%  –
14.8 litre blocks  75%  25%
Cyclinder heads  –  100%
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Foundries was a manufacturing centre with its advantage being a lower 
cost base. Foreign ownership had conferred a number of advantages for the 
firm. The Mannheim foundry was able to provide expertise and technology. 
But most important was the expanded access to global markets. All quoting 
for exports went through DaimlerChrysler who managed marketing and 
distribution. 
In follow up interviews conducted in 2010,12 the firm was starting to 
emerge from the extremely difficult recessionary phase. Heavy exposure to 
the European and American truck industries had had a devastating impact on 
sales. In addition, the relatively strong rand and rising electricity prices and 
supply constraints were a major problem. 
The transformation of ADE from a small scale, monopoly engine producer 
for the domestic market to a large scale exporter of castings and machined 
components probably involved a degree of change comparable with the 
restructuring of east European manufacturing operations in the post-socialist 
era. Employment had fallen to 700 in 2004 but by 2007 was up to 1,100 
although it declined again during the recession of 2009. 
The case of Atlantis Diesel Engines illustrates that even though the 
nature of initial investments that took place made it impossible to compete 
internationally, learning had been rapid and with more appropriate invest-
ments, ADE (and then Atlantis Foundries) has been able to build a rapidly 
growing export business on the basis of its accumulated skills in core 
capabilities such as the manufacture of engine blocks. 
3.2  Toyota – Upgrading the Supply Network
In a producer driven value chain involving the assembly of large numbers 
of components, the strategy adopted by the assembler is of key importance. 
In the development of the automotive industry in Japan, vehicle assemblers 
such as Toyota played a key role in the development of ancillary firms.13 Best 
practice in the automotive industry has increasingly involved assemblers 
developing closer linkages with component suppliers and providing them with 
technological assistance as well as devolving responsibility to them. 
By the mid 1990s, more cooperative relationships between assemblers 
and component suppliers had not yet emerged to any significant extent in 
South Africa except insofar as the industry was small and personal contacts 
played an important role. Most component producers did not receive 
significant assistance from assemblers and most firms did not see a more 
significant trend towards closer cooperation. 
Toyota, South Africa’s largest motor vehicle assembler had gone further 
than most others in developing its own supplier network. It was more focused 
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Motor Corporation in Japan and also because it had developed an extensive 
supply network, both of in-house components and partly owned supply 
companies. So while Toyota had been developing global sourcing, it saw 
its local suppliers as stakeholders and had the objective of raising them to 
world standards. 
In the face of increased price competition which had already led to 
reduced market share, Toyota had introduced a two pronged strategy aimed 
at driving down component costs as well as improving quality and delivery. 
So while domestic suppliers were regarded as stakeholders, they nevertheless 
had to compete and Toyota was aiming at cost reductions of 2.5-5 per cent per 
annum. It was also increasing global sourcing from the international Toyota 
network. It was clear that the prevailing local content levels of 52-55 per 
cent14 were unlikely to be maintained at least for the lower volume models. 
Toyota had reduced the number of suppliers and planned to further reduce 
these numbers as a result of increased world sourcing following the abolition 
of local content requirements. 
The second prong of Toyota’s supply strategy was aimed at upgrading the 
capacity of its supply network. These interventions took a number of forms. 
For firms within the Toyota group, TSA was very involved in the negotiation 
of license agreements to ensure that exactly the right types of technology 
were secured. Toyota had recently introduced the Toyota Supplier Assessment 
system, which benchmarked all suppliers according to a detailed set of criteria. 
The kanban system was being extended and a Suppliers Council consisting of 
top suppliers had been established. A further initiative was the establishment 
of a Product Engineering Group consisting of goshi teams comprising 
engineers, quality specialists and platform teams who work with suppliers. 
In 1995, intensive involvement with suppliers was at an early stage 
at Toyota and there appeared to be two key constraints to the supplier 
development process. Firstly, the relatively low volumes and wide range 
of components required by Toyota and other assemblers militated against 
achievement of world class productivity standards most glaringly in the 
case of JIT production. Secondly, Toyota’s own progress in terms of work 
organization was limited at that time so that the company may have been 
placing demands on suppliers which it had not itself met and had difficulty 
introducing in South Africa’s troubled industrial relations milieu. 
The Impact of Foreign Ownership
Toyota’s situation had changed very fundamentally by early 2007 when the 
next set of interviews was conducted.15 The company had become a subsidiary 
of Toyota Motor Corporation and was being converted into a global production 
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includes two high volume models, the Corolla and international multipurpose 
vehicle (IMV). Full incorporation into Toyota’s global production system 
and the transition to world scale production had important implications for 
suppliers as the firm was trying to increase local content and was achieving 
the volumes which made this possible. A recent poll of suppliers had found 
that they regarded Toyota as the assembler firm which was most supportive of 
building the supply network. According to TSA president, Johan van Zyl, 
  unless you have strong supplier base there is no reason for your existence … it’s 
in everyone’s interest for us to go to our suppliers and help them with quality and 
logistics, and link them into our system.16 
But at the same time, the number of domestic suppliers was being reduced and 
by 2007 consisted mainly of global firms.17 In 2002, Toyota had 7 platforms 
with 160 local suppliers (Table 3). By early 2007 there were only two primary 
platforms and 75 suppliers. While local content was hardly changed, the 
position of suppliers had been transformed with a huge increase in the share 
of locally produced parts (by value) being sourced from ‘global suppliers’.
Toyota’s preference was to deal with foreign owned suppliers or joint 
ventures. From 2002 Toyota SA had spent much effort trying to partner local 
firms with major foreign suppliers. Even a 25 per cent foreign owned joint 
venture would effectively be run by the foreign firm and in most cases the 
foreign partner would increase its stake over time. For this reason, local firms 
were frequently not supportive of this initiative as they were reluctant to cede 
control. Many asked Toyota to help them set up a technical agreement but 
while this route remained a possibility, it was not Toyota’s favoured option 
as licence payments were cost-raising. In dealing with locally owned firms 
Table 3: Changes Affecting Toyota Suppliers from 2002 to 2007
  2002  2007
No. of platforms  7  2
No. of suppliers  160  75
Local content (%)  40-45  40-45
  Old Corolla  New Corolla
  (2002 model)  (2007 model)
% of local components  41  82
produced by global   (45% - global firms – non Japanese
suppliers (Corolla)  22% - Japanese firms
  13% - technical agreements with
  global company)
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reluctant to relinquish control, TSA cited itself as an example of a firm which 
had only been able to survive and expand because the previous owners, the 
Wessels family, had seen the necessity of Toyota Motor Corporation taking 
a controlling stake. 
In spite of the high volumes being achieved and the fact that Toyota was 
keen to increase local content, this had not increased and remained at 40-45 
per cent for both the Corolla and the IMV18. The position of local suppliers 
excluded from this network was extremely precarious. This group consisted 
of a multitude of smaller firms with capabilities in areas such as tooling 
and press parts. However, without close links to the design and technology 
of global suppliers they faced marginalization. Ironically, while the lack of 
volume has always been a concern in the component industry, these smaller 
firms found it difficult to cope with the model volumes in excess of 100,000 
units per year that Toyota was now achieving. 
The second tier of suppliers was also regarded as weak with limited skill 
levels. Toyota was pessimistic about their prospects. This is one reason that 
local content remained low. While the new global suppliers were encouraged 
by Toyota to expand their own local content, these firms were importing sub-
components from countries such as China and local firms could not compete. 
Supplier development depended on the cycle of new model introductions. 
Following the launch of the IMV project in 2005, Toyota had identified 17 
high risk suppliers and appointed a team of mainly retired technical staff, 
dubbed ‘grey berets’, to work with these firms in areas ranging from kaizen 
plans to press loading and human resource development. Toyota also assisted 
other smaller, domestically and foreign owned suppliers. The larger, foreign 
owned suppliers received back up from their parent companies but according 
to Toyota management, many foreign owned firms received little support from 
the parent company and were quite weak in some respects. 
In 2010, Toyota had started planning for new replacement models for the 
Corolla and IMV which are to be introduced in 2012-2013.19 The plan was 
now to increase local content to 60 per cent, which involved two strategies. 
The first was to bring in new multinational suppliers. Interestingly, Toyota 
was cooperating with competitor vehicle producers to encourage direct 
investments by foreign component suppliers. The second prong of the strategy 
was to encourage more localization of sub-components by first tier suppliers. 
This strategy was being pursued by encouraging first tier suppliers to develop 
their own supply networks and also assisting to arrange technical agreements 
where required. If this eventuates it would represent a reversal of the shift 
to assembly by first tier producers which took place in the first phase of 
internationalization. 
Toyota’s evolving relationship with its suppliers is fairly typical of 
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base had been consolidated and the level of foreign ownership was much 
increased. Toyota increasingly dealt with global follow-source firms which 
had either established operations in South Africa through wholly own firms 
or joint ventures. Much effort had gone into facilitating these arrangements. 
Toyota continued to work with local suppliers but the number of these was 
much reduced. Some domestic firms, which were not part of this new supply 
chain, have become second tier suppliers to the new global first tier and others 
have sought out opportunities in the aftermarket. The remainder face very 
bleak prospects.
3.3  Alfred Teves Brake Systems – Supplying Low Volume Assembly
   Industry 
The scale of production has been one of the central problems facing the 
South African automotive industry. The cost premium incurred by component 
makers for producing a wide range of products at low volume is considerable. 
The case of Alfred Teves illustrates the cost penalties incurred by low volume 
production and how this has influenced investment patterns and technological 
effort.
Alfred Teves produces braking systems under licence from Alfred Teves 
AG, which is now owned by Continental Automotive Systems. Alfred Teves 
was set up originally for volume production in the early 1980s when the South 
African market was booming and there was the perception that it would also 
become a major supply source to Africa. Instead, however, volumes declined 
and a wider range of vehicles was produced. At the time of the first interviews 
in 1995, the firm was being further squeezed as it lost its export markets 
when ITT divested and was struggling to compete because of the high costs 
resulting from short production runs in the domestic market. 
The future of firms such as Ate depended very much on the strategies of 
local assemblers. The advantages of higher volume production were apparent 
in the strategy of BMW, which at that stage was planning to source the right 
hand drive version of the E46 from South Africa. The firm planned to be 
producing 50,000 3-Series vehicles out of South Africa by 2000. This would 
have had a major impact on the local component sector as BMW wished to 
source 70 per cent of its components domestically and was encouraging its 
German component suppliers to take equity stakes in South African licensee 
firms. The price savings that could be achieved from greater economies of 
scale were considerable. 
These savings could have been achieved by a reduction in fixed costs 
especially in the amortization of machinery. The key factor would have 
been reduced machine downtime because of a smaller number of machine 
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be machined per year at 65 per cent machine efficiency. Changeovers also 
required that before a volume run began the first off sample was tested for 
quality. Then production could begin at a rate of one piece per minute. In 
theory at the end of one shift (480 minutes) 480 parts could be produced. 
This amounted to five months worth of stock for a low volume vehicle such 
as the BMW 5 series. So for low volume vehicles, the tendency was to invest 
in flexible CNC equipment (R1 million to R2 million at the time) with a 
changeover time of 20 minutes. This machinery was highly flexible but very 
slow for low volumes with a machining time of 14 minutes per piece (Table 
4). Dedicated machining lines were designed for speed and comprised a set 
of eight hydraulically operated fixtures on a rotating table. Eight processes 
(drilling, milling, etc.) were, therefore, happening simultaneously. With 
flexible CNC machining equipment each process is separate, accounting for 
a total of at least eight minutes plus the time for the machine to replace each 
tool back in the magazine. Machine changeovers on dedicated equipment are 
a complicated and arduous task involving removal of the machining table, 
fixture stations and tools and the disconnection of hydraulic clamping devices. 
These tasks were carried out by artisans. This type of dedicated machinery is 
not designed for frequent changeovers and foreign technical experts visiting 
the plant had been amazed that what they considered to be machine rebuilds 
were carried out on a routine basis. Frequent changeovers can also lead to 
quality problems.
Low volumes and the proliferation of models in the domestic market 
were therefore the major obstacles to improved competitiveness. Considerable 
technological effort went into incremental changes to increase flexibility. 
To reduce tooling costs for the wide diversity of part numbers produced, 
a number of innovations had been introduced. For example, broach tools 
had been divided into segments to make them more versatile. Another large 
investment was in milling cutters. The numbers of these required had been 
reduced by putting in special inserts which allow four sides of the cutter 
instead of two to be used. The presetting of tools on CNC equipment had 
Table 4: Flexible Machinery versus Dedicated Automation at ADE, 1995
  Flexible CNC machining line  Dedicated automation
Cost  R1-2m  R10m
Changeover time  20 minutes  6-8 hours
Machining time per  14 minutes  1 minute
   piece
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reduced downtime in that area due to machine changeovers. On transfer lines, 
changeover times had been reduced from 16-20 hours to 6-8 hours. 
The cost penalties incurred as a result of low volumes and complexity in 
the domestic market were considerable. What was clear, however, was that 
firms such as Alfred Teves had developed considerable production capability 
in operating complex machinery under very unfavourable conditions, in 
introducing small innovations to increase flexibility and in the capacity to 
undertake machine rebuilds to stretch the life of capital equipment. In terms 
of technological capability, firms like this were a match for many low cost 
producers internationally although on a simple, price comparison they would 
be regarded as ‘uncompetitive’.
 
Later Developments
At follow up interviews conducted in 2006,20 the firm’s position had not 
changed dramatically. It still operated under licence from Alfred Teves and 
was reliant primarily on the domestic market. One major new development 
had been the investment of R17 million in a new plant, opened in 2004, to 
manufacture friction products for the local and international aftermarket. But 
this shift to producing for the aftermarket, which now accounted for 33 per 
cent of sales, reflected the low margins in original equipment (OE) production 
and in itself was a defensive response to fiercer global competition. 
OE volumes had increased to some extent but were still a major constraint 
and the firm reported that the benefits derived from this had been offset by 
increased competitive pressures resulting from global sourcing. The main 
domestic markets were BMW and DaimlerChrysler. In spite of the fact that 
BMW was building 50,000 three series vehicles per year this model incorpo-
rated three different front ends and three different rear ends each with differing 
brake requirements. Alfred Teves’ total 2006 calliper production of 245,000 
units was therefore spread across 12 part numbers giving average production 
per part number of just over 20,000 units. While this had doubled from ten 
years previously, it was still a very low volume and the company required 
50,000 units per part number to be reasonably profitable in OE production. 
Calliper production was expected to increase substantially, but the addition of 
eight new part numbers meant that production per part number would hardly 
increase. Alfred Teves considered that ideal volumes would be 900,000 units 
per year so the plant remained small in terms of total output with a wide range 
of parts being produced. Low volume, multi part production together with the 
fact that the vehicle producers expected Ate to maintain large buffer stocks 
resulted in inventory levels remaining high at 20 per cent of turnover.
Ate accepted that foreign ownership would yield major advantages 
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operation although it still had an option to do so. This constrained access to 
the multinational’s global network and Continental favoured affiliate suppliers 
and had established new, low cost capacity in Slovakia, India and China. Its 
new Welsh plant was focused on low volume, niche products. 
Local content in Alfred Teves products had been reduced from 65 per 
cent to 35 per cent. This was partly as a result of the closing of the foundry in 
2004, but other sub-components including brake linings were also now being 
imported. Employment had fallen from 420 to 230 in 2005 and this latter 
figure included a staff of 25 in the new friction plant. Over the same period, 
sales had increased indicating both rapid productivity growth and lower in-
house value added per unit of final sales. 
Foreign ownership has frequently meant a decline in R&D as domestic 
firms adopt the precise process and product specifications of the parent firm.21 
But Ate, a locally owned firm, had also reduced its R&D capacity for these 
reasons. The relationship with the licensor was good although royalty costs 
were quite high: 3.5 per cent for new products, 2.5 per cent for locally adapted 
products and 2 per cent in the aftermarket. 
Alfred Teves illustrates two dilemmas facing component firms. In the 
1990s, it grappled with the problems of low volumes and multi product 
production and showed considerable resourcefulness in dealing with this 
issue. A decade later, although policy had induced a degree of rationalization 
in vehicle production, volumes remained low. In the more globalized 
environment of the early 21st century a further potential difficulty was 
apparent. As a domestically owned firm without proprietary technology, 
Alfred Teves’s options were quite constrained without a foreign partner. The 
firm reacted by continuing to improve its proficiency in flexible production, 
by reducing the level of integration within the plant, by importing a greater 
share of sub-components and by increasingly investing in production for the 
aftermarket where margins were higher. 
3.4  Behr – The Need for a Foreign Partner
For firms wishing to operate as first tier suppliers, a foreign equity link either 
in the form of a joint venture or foreign ownership has become increasingly 
important both to provide technology and links to global networks. A growing 
role for foreign owned firms is characteristic of the automotive industry in 
many emerging markets and brings certain advantages but also raises question 
marks over the future of locally owned firms.22 An example is the acquisition 
of a group of South African based firms by the Stuttgart based Behr Group.23 
Behr is a large German multinational whose major products are vehicle 
air-conditioning and engine cooling systems. In common with many other 
German suppliers, the share of production outside of high cost Germany was 
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As the South African automotive industry has become more internationally 
integrated, foreign owned vehicle manufacturers have been drawn more 
closely into the networks of their respective parent companies. This 
increasingly meant that they wanted selected suppliers to be located in South 
Africa. The Behr Group faced these pressures from key customers (BMW, 
Daimler and VW) who were looking to expand vehicle production in South 
Africa. In particular, the Mercedes C Class export project offered the prospect 
of large contracts in the form of the air-conditioner, radiator and condenser 
for this vehicle, which was to be built in volumes of 40,000 per annum in 
South Africa. 
According to the managing director of Behr (SA), the greenfield route 
was considered to be very demanding in terms of resources and also involved 
fairly high levels of risk. Maintaining a licensing arrangement was seen as 
risky because it involved losing control of core technology (Waldburger, 
2000).
From the side of the South African operation, it was important to have 
a global partner. As local management put it “the MIDP was starting to 
bite” and without a foreign investor the company “could have stagnated into 
the aftermarket or even died”.24 Behr proved to be an ideal candidate. Not 
only was it actively looking for an investment in South Africa as a result of 
pressure from its customers, but the Behr Group already had a well developed 
relationship with the South African company because of technology developed 
by the latter, which had been licensed to Behr. Behr purchased 100 per cent 
of the company in 1999 for an amount of DM50 million. 
Performance of the Subsidiary
The basic strategy of the South African subsidiary has been to focus its 
activities in selected core areas. Turnover doubled in the three years up to 
2002 to approximately R620 million. Half of sales were original equipment 
and the remaining half were to the aftermarket. Direct exports accounted for 
a third of sales and were nearly all to the aftermarket. While the company did 
not export significant volumes of original equipment components, it supplied 
to domestic vehicle assemblers who supply both domestic and export markets. 
Growth was rapid and the South African subsidiary was highly profitable. 
Behr (South Africa) had 1,100 employees at four sites in 2002, a number 
which had increased slightly over the previous few years (up from 1,055 
in 2000). Prior to this, the firm had been experiencing ‘jobless growth’ as it 
restructured in the face of tariff reductions and growing export opportunities. 
In spite of these changes, the firm remained very labour intensive compared 
to the overall Behr Group. This was due to lower levels of automation but was 
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It is clear that this investment was advantageous for the local operation, 
which faced the prospect of cutting production and increasingly competing 
on price in the aftermarket. Local management expected that employment 
would have fallen and the company would have struggled to maintain its 
technological edge. Since the acquisition, in each business division there had 
been productivity and efficiency improvements. 
As has been typical in the component sector, perhaps the most important 
contribution of the investor has been to facilitate access to key automotive 
customers. The Behr Group is one of the largest worldwide suppliers to the 
three major German automakers (VW, Daimler and BMW) all of which 
have plants in South Africa, which increasingly act as a base for export. The 
export drive has necessitated the introduction of new technology on a large 
scale and the car firms have actively promoted investment and joint ventures 
by German component suppliers. In the Port Elizabeth air conditioner plant, 
production has been greatly increased through obtaining the contract to 
supply the C Class Mercedes. The copper based radiator plant at Silverton, 
Pretoria which was looking at reducing production because of the transfer of 
technology to aluminium based radiators has attracted additional business. 
Production from a recently closed copper based plant in Spain was transferred 
to Behr (SA). 
A few years prior to being acquired by Behr, the South African heat 
transfer division was spending 4-5 per cent of turnover on R&D. This was 
significantly higher than most component producers in South Africa and the 
firm was doing fundamental research and development. The South African 
operation had even developed innovative production technology, which had 
been licensed to the Behr Group. This ‘composite deposition’ process involved 
a new method of braising aluminium using a specially developed powder. 
But this innovative capability was not a significant factor in the decision to 
make the acquisition and by 2000 the situation had changed radically. After 
the acquisition took place, all R&D activity in South Africa was transferred to 
Germany or shut down. The South African subsidiary only did development 
work although its capability for this was expanding partly due to the high cost 
of assistance from the parent company.25
South African management saw this development as positive for two 
reasons. Firstly, the South African subsidiary was able to focus to a greater 
extent on its core activities. Secondly, they now had access to cutting edge 
R&D. An example of access to this know-how was the huge saving achieved 
in the course of a short visit from the parent company by a specialist in 
furnace technology. The Durban plant was set to invest R13 million in a new 
furnace to increase capacity, but by reorganizing the spacing of parts and the 
adjustment of heating elements they were able to increase the capacity of the 
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The South African location offered some important cost advantages. An 
area where it was particularly competitive was in small batch production. 
Local management claimed to be able to out-compete the German plants 
by a significant margin when it came to the low volumes required in the 
aftermarket. This was because levels of automation were relatively low and 
the South African subsidiary had high levels of experience and expertise in 
rapid changeovers and low volume production. Behr has continued to become 
more integrated into the global activities of the parent company and exports, 
investment and employment has continued to expand. Along with much of 
the component sector Behr has moved from being “wide and shallow to 
narrow and deep.”26 The mode of integration has allowed for an optimal 
combination of activities which enable the firm to achieve world scale in 
capital intensive activities while producing efficiently for the low volume 
domestic assembly industry and also using its expertise in low volume, labour 
intensive production for the aftermarket.
 
4.  Conclusion
Industrial change takes place at the firm level and examining these changes 
is helpful in illuminating the processes of technological learning and 
restructuring in the context of a liberalizing trade regime. We have defined 
three overlapping stages of firm level responses as the sector moves from 
protection to a more open trade regime. The first stage is the process of 
adaptation and development under protection, the ‘platypus effect’. The 
second, we have termed ‘internal restructuring’. The third involves external 
restructuring or ‘internationalization,’ and has frequently involved a redefining 
of relationships (including ownership) vis-à-vis foreign firms. 
4.1  Adaptation and Development Under Protection – The ‘Platypus
   Effect’ 
South Africa’s automotive component industry has historically been 
inward oriented with low levels of exports. The level of reliance on foreign 
technology was high and this was mainly secured through licensing and tariff 
hopping FDI. In the context of the small domestic market, protection led to a 
low volume, high variety production structure. This was manifested in a wide 
range of problems, which made the sector uncompetitive. These problems 
included low rates of machine utilization, high levels of inventory, a weakly-
developed supplier network and logistical problems. 
We have argued, however, that while most component firms in the 
early 1990s were heavily reliant on foreign technology and had very limited 
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dynamic is an over-simplification. Learning and incremental innovation had 
been significant and was ongoing. However, much of their technological 
effort was directed at the problems of low volume, multi-product production 
rather than simply minimizing costs in a mass production environment. As 
a result, firms developed forms of expertise which counted for little in the 
international marketplace. For instance they were flexible, but unit production 
costs were high. 
The fact that firms had therefore accumulated considerable technological 
capability does not necessarily support the view that the Latin American-
style experience of import substituting industrialization provided the basis 
for industrial learning and later export expansion (Teitel and Thoumi, 1986; 
Katz, 2000). While substantial learning took place, the costs of restructuring 
have also been high. It is by no means clear that the industry had to go 
through this process of ‘distorted’ development under heavy protection. With 
hindsight a more rational industry structure could have been established from 
the start with the judicious use of industrial policy and subsidies. The East 
Asian experience of combining protection with export support from an early 
stage is relevant here.
4.2  The Process of Internal Restructuring 
Component firms had to make dramatic changes to their mode of operation 
as a result of liberalization and have shown considerable resourcefulness in 
doing so. The key to successful adjustment in the South African automotive 
component sector has been the effectiveness with which firms have been able 
to adapt accumulated capabilities to a production environment, which requires 
higher volumes and lower costs for the global market. 
The rapid expansion of exports is indicative of a positive supply response. 
Nevertheless, the process of adjustment has been extremely difficult, requiring 
not only new skills and technology but frequently new fixed capital and 
access to new markets. One important constraint has been in the area of 
fixed investment, particularly where firms had made investments in flexible 
machinery well suited to the old, protected structure but generally more 
expensive for high volume production (e.g. Alfred Teves and ADE).
Work organization is an important part of technological upgrading. As a 
number of studies have attested, there has been a rapid process of catch up 
over the past decade27 but this alone is insufficient to achieve international 
competitiveness. The supply base is weak and assemblers have only recently 
begun to develop more cooperative links with suppliers aimed at upgrading 
the supply base. The abolition of local content requirements and the ability to 
rebate import duties has meant that the easiest short term route for assemblers 
is simply to import. While there are some indications of assemblers increasing 198      Anthony Black  
investment in the supply base and encouraging foreign firms to invest in local 
companies, a more common response as tariffs decline is to source product 
internationally. On the other hand, assemblers have been keen to promote 
exports but this has been predominantly from a very small selected group 
of suppliers. 
The pressures to undertake technological effort come from disparate 
sources. A culture of learning within the organization appears to be an 
important firm level factor and this is undoubtedly spurred by greater com-
petition as was occurring through tariff reductions. An interesting question 
was the perceived reluctance to move towards establishing independent 
technological capability and proprietary technology in product as opposed 
to process development. Virtually all domestically owned, first tier suppliers 
operated under licence and the exceptions tended to be in peripheral 
components. Licensing involves substantial costs in terms of royalties 
and constrains firms in export markets. But firms producing sophisticated 
components saw little sense in moving off licence and lacked the capacity 
and size to catch up to the fast moving technology frontier. Many firms in 
fact would see the only alternative being to establish a joint venture with a 
global supplier rather than establishing their own design capability. In fact, 
firms were remarkably sanguine in their approach to R&D and technological 
development more generally. In contrast, perhaps, to academic researchers, 
they do not see R&D as a goal in itself! 
4.3  The Limitations of Internal Restructuring: Internationalization and
   the Role of FDI
Although firms showed considerable ingenuity in responding to the pressures 
of globalization, one of the most striking observations is the limitations of 
‘internal restructuring’ and the resulting requirement for ‘external restruc-
turing’ or internationalization. Firms have needed to integrate or re-position 
themselves within global value chains. Frequently, this has required the 
introduction of a foreign partner or even the takeover by a foreign firm. 
Both competitive pressures and the demands of customers have driven this 
process. 
This has, of course, has been very evident in the assembly industry. TSA 
itself had no choice but to sell a majority stake to Toyota Motor Corporation 
and become a subsidiary of the Japanese multinational. This hugely expanded 
its potential and it rapidly became South Africa’s leading vehicle exporter. It 
also had dramatic implications for suppliers who were themselves frequently 
forced to seek out foreign partners. 
ADE clearly needed a foreign partner, so did Behr. They were essential 
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Teves faces increasing pressures as a first tier supplier in the domestic market 
and also in export markets. As a result, Teves is increasingly seeking new 
opportunities in the aftermarket. An interesting question, which has not been 
explored here, is whether the weaknesses engendered by import substitution 
in fact led later to more rapid expansion in foreign ownership than may have 
otherwise been the case. Any negative implications arising from foreign 
ownership have to be tempered by the realization that it was absolutely 
necessary for the survival of many firms.
Foreign owned suppliers themselves make much less use of domestic 
content. Toyota was, until recently, pessimistic about the capabilities of 
second tier suppliers and its first tier, global suppliers were using a growing 
percentage of imported sub-components. Behr has reduced costs by sourcing 
internationally and local content in its air-conditioner units has been reduced. 
But growing importation of sub-components was not restricted to foreign 
owned firms; Ate had also embarked on such a strategy. 
Foreign ownership also has implications for R&D in South African 
based firms. There is less need for ongoing adaptations of products as they 
become standardized to global designs. Behr, for instance, closed its R&D 
division. However, foreign ownership brings new technology and easier 
access to expertise in the high volume, low cost production required for global 
competitiveness. Direct support for R&D may, therefore, be of little benefit 
to most firms unless its objectives were clearly specified. A large component 
producer such as ADE did not even have a formal R&D department even 
though it has been a rapid learner. 
For firms to adjust to a very different trade regime is difficult, time 
consuming and expensive. It is, therefore, important that the process of 
trade liberalization takes account of the fact that a significant amount of firm 
level ‘inefficiency’ may result from the specific industrial structure and also 
that the nature of fixed investments mean that adjustment to new market 
conditions cannot be achieved overnight. South African component suppliers 
are now more specialized and operate at much higher scale. Levels of foreign 
ownership are higher and they are more competitive. But the process of 
restructuring has been a painful one and is by no means complete.
Notes
 1.  One case study is of supplier development at an assembler firm (Toyota).
 2.  See Pack (2006) for a discussion of econometric versus case study approaches to 
technology transfer.
 3.  See, for example, Katz (1987) and for a review of this early literature see Herbert-
Copley (1990).
 4.  For overviews see Black (2001, 2009). 200      Anthony Black  
 5.  See also the Behr and Toyota case studies in the following section.
 6.  Lorentzen’s (2005) case studies provide some examples. See also the Behr case 
study in this paper.
 7.  This conclusion is supported by the Toyota case study cited in this paper.
 8.  Interview with ADE financial director. 
 9.  This section is based on an interview with J. Davies (foundry senior general 
manager).
  10.  This section is based primarily on an interview with John McEwan, managing 
director of Atlantis Foundries and a plant tour conducted by Tony O’Brien in 
April 2007.
  11.  Interviews. 
  12.  Interview with Derik du Plessis, Managing Director, Atlantis Foundries. 
  13.  For an overview of Toyota’s relationship with its suppliers at the global level, see 
Tsuji (2007).
  14.  This measure is as a percentage of wholesale selling price and therefore includes 
assembly.
  15.  The following section draws heavily on interviews conducted in January 2007 
with Henry Pretorius (Senior Vice President, PD&P, Toyota SA) and Nigel Ward 
(General Manager Purchasing, Toyota SA).
  16.  ‘Fortune favours the brave’ (Financial Mail, “Special Report: The Motor 
Industry”, 15 September 2006). 
  17.  Global supplier in this context refers to a foreign owned or joint venture operating 
in South Africa or a domestically owned firm with a technical agreement with a 
global supplier.
  18.  The definition being used here is of component purchases only and excludes 
assembly. 
  19.  Interview with Henry Pretorius. 
  20.  Interviews with Peter Hocknell (managing director) and Mike Teasdale (OE 
director), Ate. 
  21.  See also following Behr case study.
  22.  See for example, Humphrey and Salerno (2000) for India and Brazil.
  23.  This section draws primarily on interviews with Ted Waldburger (managing 
director) and Gavin Simkins (financial director) of Behr SA conducted in 2002.
  24.  Interviews
  25.  Interview with Justin Barnes (industry consultant).
  26.  Interview with Behr SA, managing director Ted Waldburger, May, 2007. 
  27.  See for example Barnes and Morris (2004).
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